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From Plyler v. Doe to Trayvon Martin: 
Toward Closing the Open Society 
Lyle Denniston* 
Abstract 
Lyle Denniston, the longest serving and most experienced 
journalist covering the United States Supreme Court, takes his 
theme of an inclusive and open society from the constitutional and 
cultural vision of the late Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and then 
offers a detailed argument that America is forfeiting—or at least 
compromising—that vision in favor of a safer, more secure and 
more cramped society, at home and abroad. The Article, taken 
from a memorial lecture in Justice Powell’s honor at Washington 
and Lee University in April 2012, draws upon a variety of very 
different societal and legal developments that are found to have in 
common the movement of people and ideas to the margins or even 
out of sight. The analysis ranges from the treatment of individuals 
captured by the American military during the perceived “war on 
terrorism,” to the new xenophobic reaction to undocumented 
immigrants, to the expanded militarization of the American 
intelligence apparatus, to the narrowing of the supposedly open 
digital culture, to the new cultural ghettoization of the white-
dominated American suburb, to the still rampant exclusion and 
discrimination against people of color and people of different 
sexual identities. Against the possible perception that Denniston 
has extolled only liberal or progressive values, he argues that 
people of all ideologies have much to lose if American society 
becomes further afraid of diversity, change, and openness. 
 
It is a distinct privilege and a high honor to be invited to 
deliver a lecture on your campus, in honor of Justice Powell—an 
                                                                                                     
 * The Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Distinguished Lecture, presented April 5, 2012 at 
the Washington and Lee University School of Law. Presently, Lyle Denniston is the 
Supreme Court reporter for scotusblog.com, an online clearinghouse of information 
about the Court. 
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esteemed graduate of your university and your law school, a 
Virginia gentleman capable of deep kindness and great tolerance, 
and a most distinguished (if initially reluctant) member of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, where he served for fifteen 
years.1 It is rewarding to know that the university houses Justice 
Powell’s papers,2 which well document a judicial career in which 
he was a dominant figure, making majorities in an often-
fragmented Court, and standing courageously alone when he felt 
the need to do so. 
I am much indebted to your colleague and classmate, Parker 
Kasmer, who has made it easy for me to be here, and I am 
grateful to the students for their civic act in inaugurating the 
Powell Lecture Series a decade ago.3 I know I am in good 
company when I take this place. 
My topic tonight is a sober one, but I would like to begin on a 
more pleasant note: a story about Justice Powell that, in fact, I 
heard from a student when I visited this campus some years ago.  
A student who sat next to me at dinner said his father was a 
friend of Justice Powell’s, and during a visit to Powell’s chambers, 
was strongly urged to send his son to Washington and Lee. The 
Justice was very enthusiastic about the college during that 
conversation. After the discussion moved on to other topics and 
then ended, the father left Powell's chambers. As he was walking 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Linda Greenhouse, Lewis Powell, Crucial Centrist Justice, Dies at 90, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/26/us/lewis-powell-
crucial-centrist-justice-dies-at-90.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (last visited Nov. 
14, 2012) (describing Justice Powell’s life) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 2. See id. (“Throughout his life, he kept strong ties to Washington and Lee, to 
which he gave his personal and Supreme Court papers, now housed in the Lewis F. 
Powell Jr. Archives on the campus in Lexington.”); About the Powell Archives, 
WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=245 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) 
(“The Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives comprises the Papers of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
other manuscript collections held by the law library, the rare book collection, and 
the archives of the School of Law.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 3. See About the Powell Lecture Series, WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF LAW, http://law.wlu.edu/powelllecture/page.asp?pageid=856 (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2012) (“In 2002, the students of Washington and Lee University School of 
Law founded The Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Distinguished Lecture Series in honor of 
former Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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down the corridor, Powell came swiftly after him, caught up with 
him, and again urged the father to make sure that the boy went 
to W&L. This time, though, he offered an argument that he must 
have felt would be most convincing: he ticked off the names of 
women’s colleges and the exact number of miles each was from 
Lexington. The lad did not tell me whether that was the clincher. 
May I turn, then, to my subject and start with an opinion 
written by Justice Powell almost exactly thirty years ago. It was 
a separate opinion in the case of Plyler v. Doe.4 The case had a 
secondary title, and it is far more descriptive: Texas v. Certain 
Named and Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children.5 
Justice Powell’s opinion6 speaks of an open society7 that, to 
my mind, no longer exists in this country for undocumented 
immigrants. You will know my sensitivity on this subject when I 
tell you that, as I write stories today about it, I refuse to describe 
such human beings as “aliens.” 
Still, the actual or threatened closing of an open society goes 
well beyond the fate of those who live in America without legal 
permission to be here. The trend is, for me, apparent in a variety 
of current policies and legal developments, perhaps very different 
from each other in fundamental ways but, in combination, 
moving people or ideas beyond the pale or, indeed, out of sight. 
We find it much easier to define something of which we are 
ignorant, or something that stirs fear in us, as necessarily to be 
excluded from our circle of acceptance. 
Part of it has to do with the creation of pariah classes, 
pushed into the category of The Other.8 Another part of it has to 
                                                                                                     
 4. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 5. See id. (noting the secondary title). 
 6. See id. at 236–41 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 7. See, e.g., id. at 237 (“The classification in question severely disadvantages 
children who are the victims of a combination of circumstances. Access from Mexico 
to this country across our 2,000-mile border, is readily available and virtually 
uncontrollable. Illegal aliens are attracted by our employment opportunities, and 
perhaps by other benefits as well.”); id. at 238 (“The classification at issue deprives 
a group of children of the opportunity for education afforded all other children 
simply because they have been assigned a legal status due to a violation of law by 
their parents.”). 
 8. See generally ADRIAAN PEPERZAK, TO THE OTHER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS (1993), available at http://docs.lib. 
purdue.edu/purduepress_ebooks/20/ (discussing the philosophical concept of The 
Other, a concept first developed by French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas).  
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do with the refusal to confront—openly and candidly—very deep 
wrongs. And part of it has to do with intentionally clogging or 
closing the channels of public discourse.  
The phenomenon extends to the creation of a military 
garrison with wired enclosures at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, in 
order to detain—perhaps for the remainder of their lives for some 
of them—a class of people we want nowhere near our shores and 
are unwilling to bring before our courts so that their fate might 
be decided justly.9 
And it reaches to a fearsome prison outside of Kabul, 
Afghanistan, where we have chosen to place another group of 
people detained as terrorist suspects, precisely to put them 
beyond the reach of our nation’s courts of law.10 
Further, it reaches the impenetrable wall of secrecy that 
surrounds a national policy that is, slowly but perceptibly, 
turning the entire American intelligence apparatus into a lethal 
military machine that does not even exempt United States 
citizens from its retribution.11 
                                                                                                     
 9. See Lyle Denniston, Court Bypasses All New Detainee Cases, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 11, 2012, 11:39 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/ 
court-bypasses-all-new-detainee-cases/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (stating that the 
Supreme Court “turned down seven separate appeals by Guantanamo Bay 
prisoners,” indicating “that it is not now inclined to further second-guess the 
government’s detention policy”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Lyle Denniston, D.C. Circuit: Last Stop for Detainees?, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 9, 
2012, 3:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/d-c-circuit-last-stop-for-
detainees/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (stating that although “the detainees very 
often win in District Court . . . not one has ever gotten released from confinement 
by court order” because “the government has never lost any of its appeals in the 
D.C. Circuit Court”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 10. See Lyle Denniston, U.S.: No Habeas Rights at Bagram, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Sept. 15, 2009, 4:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/09/u-s-no-habeas-rights-
at-bagram (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (describing the argument made by the 
United States that Bagram detainees were not entitled to habeas rights and noting 
District Judge John D. Bates’s “suggestion that the U.S. military may be using the 
Bagram prison site as a way to put detainees beyond the reach of American civilian 
courts”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010) (failing to 
reach “the merits of the alleged authorization of the targeted killing of a U.S. 
citizen oversees” because “questions of justiciability require[d] dismissal of [the] 
case at the outset”); Lyle Denniston, New Challenge to Drone Killings, 
SCOTUSBLOG (July 18, 2012, 3:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/ new-
challenge-to-drone-killings/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (describing a lawsuit 
initiated by two civil rights groups “seeking to hold top government officials to 
blame legally for killing three U.S. citizens in attacks from the air in Yemen”) (on 
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Some of those developments may be known to you. 
But there is more, much more, in areas of our culture where 
free exploration had seemed the norm. There is the determined 
effort—stalled for the time being by a true internet uprising—to 
put severe new restraints on the openness of digital culture.12 The 
Supreme Court has recently declared that there is no guarantee 
that a public domain in literature and music has any 
constitutional claim to remain open when the juggernaut of 
Hollywood-driven copyright bears down upon it.13 
And there is the steady march of intolerance against people 
because of the color of their skin or the nature of their sexual 
identity. We have come to the place, it seems, where a black 
teenager can be slain in the street by a neighborhood sentinel,14 
and we are left to debate not the inexplicable reason for such an 
act, but whether it was legally justified by a barrel-chested law 
that tells one to “stand his or her ground.”15 And we have come to 
the place, it is obvious, where three distinguished judges of a 
state supreme court can be denied reelection solely because they 
interpreted an equality guarantee in their state’s constitution to 
allow for same-sex marriage.16 
                                                                                                     
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. See Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011) (expanding law 
enforcement’s ability to combat online copyright infringement); Preventing Real 
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property (Protect 
I.P.) Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (same); see also Jonathan Weisman, In Fight 
Over Piracy Bills, New Economy Rises Against Old, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/technology/web-protests-piracy-bill-and-2-key-
senators-change-course.html?hp=&pagewanted= all (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) 
(describing the internet’s strong opposition to the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act 
and Protect I.P. Act and the subsequent withdrawal of congressional support for 
the bills) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (determining that a statute 
allowing works to be removed from the public domain “does not transgress 
constitutional limitations on Congress’ authority”). 
 14. See Greg Botelho, What Happened the Night Trayvon Martin Died, CNN 
(last updated May 23, 2012, 10:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/ 
justice/florida-teen-shooting-details/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) 
(outlining the events surrounding Trayvon Martin’s death) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 15. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2012) (“A person who is not engaged in an 
unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a 
right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and 
meet force with force . . . .”). 
 16. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009) (holding that the 
1804 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799 (2012) 
In the face of such unsettling times, let me start over again 
with Lewis Powell and those “Undocumented Alien Children”17 in 
Texas.  
The Texas legislature had passed a law barring local school 
districts from using any state funds to finance the education of 
children who were not legal residents of this country and denying 
such children even entry into the public schools.18 By a vote of 
five to four, in Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court found that 
statute to be a violation of the equal protection guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.19 
Justice Powell wrote separately,20 even while joining the 
majority opinion written by Justice Brennan.21 Recalling that the 
Court had previously made clear that children are not to be 
condemned for the misdeeds of their parents,22 Justice Powell 
wrote: 
The classification at issue deprives a group of children of the 
opportunity for education afforded all other children simply 
because they have been assigned a legal status due to a 
violation of law by their parents. These children thus have 
been singled out for a lifelong penalty and stigma. A legislative 
classification that threatens the creation of an underclass of 
                                                                                                     
Iowa marriage statute limiting marriage to a union between a man and a woman 
“violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution”); see also Grant 
Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices, DES MOINES REG. (Nov. 3, 2010, 4:26 AM), 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20101103/NEWS09/11030390/ Iowans- 
dismiss-three-justices?gcheck=1 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (discussing the election 
results) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 17. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (containing a secondary title that 
refers to the appellees as “Certain Named and Unnamed Undocumented Alien 
Children”). 
 18. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1981) (withholding state funding 
for the education of children not legally admitted into the country and allowing 
school districts to refuse to enroll such children), invalidated by Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202 (1982). 
 19. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. (striking down the Texas statute because it 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 20. See id. at 237–41 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 21. See id. at 205–30 (majority opinion). 
 22. See id. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring) (“‘[V]isiting . . . condemnation on the 
head of an infant’ for the misdeeds of the parents is illogical, unjust, and ‘contrary 
to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship 
to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.’” (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972))). 
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future citizens and residents cannot be reconciled with one of 
the fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 
Those words are phrased as law, but they are infused with a 
sense of the decency that was so much a part of the work of Lewis 
Powell. There is in those phrases not the remotest hint of 
intolerance. He laments the failure of the federal government to 
police the border, but he refuses to make the children pay for that 
governmental lapse.24 
Viewed from today’s perspective, Lewis Powell’s vision of an 
inclusive society, one generous in its acceptance of people who 
look and are different from the majority, seems somewhat dated, 
somewhat unreal, perhaps somewhat naive. 
Move forward from Plyler v. Doe, leap across thirty years, 
and one encounters a seemingly different world. One encounters, 
for example, a state law like Alabama’s House Bill 56.25 One of 
the provisions of that new state law turns public school officials 
into immigration enforcers, requiring all public schools in the 
state to determine if each child entering any grade was born 
outside the United States or is a child of an illegal alien parent.26 
Because of Plyler v. Doe, they cannot be barred from school,27 but 
the information gathered about them can provide the basis for 
                                                                                                     
 23. Id. at 238–39. 
 24. See id. at 240–41 (“So long as the ease of entry remains inviting, and the 
power to deport is exercised infrequently by the Federal Government, the 
additional expense of admitting these children to public schools might fairly be 
shared by the Federal and State governments.”). 
 25. See ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-1 to -30 (2012) (attempting to fight illegal 
immigration in Alabama by maximizing enforcement of federal laws and 
cooperation with federal authorities), partially invalidated by United States v. 
Alabama, Nos. 11-14532, 11-14674, 2012 WL 3553503 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2012) 
(finding that federal law preempted some provisions of House Bill 56). 
 26. See id. § 31-13-27(a)(1) (“Every public . . . school in this state, at the time 
of enrollment . . . shall determine whether the student enrolling . . . was born 
outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully 
present in the United States . . . .”), invalidated by Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. 
Governor of Ala., Nos. 11-14535, 11-14675, 2012 WL 3553613 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 
2012) (finding the provision in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 27. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (determining that Texas cannot 
“deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to 
other children residing within its borders” without showing that the denial would 
further a substantial state interest and finding that Texas did not make the 
necessary showing). 
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their, or at least their parents’, deportation in what would surely 
be a crisis for many families. 
Then cross over into Louisiana. Officials of that state 
recently asked the Supreme Court of the United States to forbid 
the federal government from counting any undocumented 
immigrants living anywhere in the United States, and to order 
the government to recalculate the 2010 Census without them.28 It 
was an undisguised effort to declare such people outside of the 
American political community because the Census data is used to 
calculate the distribution of seats in the United States House of 
Representatives.29 It is a fact that, since the first census in 1790, 
all such undocumented people have been counted.30 
The Court did turn down that request, without comment, in 
March 2012,31 but that did not take away the message that 
Louisiana’s legal maneuver sent, and, indeed, it does not prevent 
Louisiana from beginning its challenge anew in a lower court. 
In addition, in April 2012, the Supreme Court held a hearing 
on Senate Bill 1070,32 the Arizona law seeking to control the lives 
                                                                                                     
 28. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Complaint, Complaint, and Brief 
in Support of Motion, Louisiana v. Bryson, 132 S. Ct. 1781 (2012) (No. 22O140 
ORG), denied by 132 S. Ct. 1781 (2012), available at http:// 
www.ag.state.la.us/Shared/ViewDoc.aspx? Type=3&Doc=312 (seeking to exclude 
illegal immigrants from the population data used to apportion seats in the House of 
Representatives) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 29. See Lyle Denniston, New Dispute Over Immigrants, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 
15, 2011, 12:10 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/new-dispute-over-
immigrants/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (describing the motivation behind the 
complaint that Louisiana sought to file) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 30. See Campbell J. Gibson & Emily Lennon, Historical Census Statistics on 
the Foreign-born Population of the United States: 1850–1990 (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census Population Div., Working Paper No. 29, 1999), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/twps0029.html 
(stating that although “[t]he first decennial census of the U.S. population was 
taken in 1790 . . . in order to obtain the population counts needed for Congressional 
apportionment . . . [a] question on place of birth, which is the source of data on the 
foreign-born population, was not added until the 1850 census” (citation omitted)) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 31. See Orders in Pending Cases, Louisiana v. Bryson, 132 S. Ct. 1781 (2012) 
(No. 22O140 ORG), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders 
/031912zor.pdf (“Motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied.”). 
 32. See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, 2010 
Ariz. Sess. Laws 113 (seeking to deter illegal immigration in Arizona), partially 
invalidated by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (considering 
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of undocumented immigrants living in that state—controls that 
are potentially so onerous that they could only be expected to 
drive many of those people out of the state altogether, and that is 
precisely its goal.33 
In a nation where, by the year 2050, according to the Census 
Bureau, 54% of the total population will be made up of 
minorities,34 these gestures among the states appear to be 
remarkable efforts to stand against history. And driven as they 
often are by claims of rampant crime by such immigrants,35 they 
add to a pervasive complex of fear. 
It is that very fear that took the life of seventeen-year-old 
Trayvon Benjamin Martin on a pleasant street—Retreat View 
Circle in Sanford, Florida—on February 26.36 The story we know 
so far is that a neighborhood watch volunteer in a gated 
community, George Zimmerman, felt the need to pursue that 
young black man wearing a hooded sweatshirt.37 Zimmerman was 
diligent about it; he apparently kept up the pursuit even though a 
                                                                                                     
whether “federal law preempts and renders invalid four separate provisions of the 
[Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act]”); Julia Preston, 
Justices to Rule on Role of the States in Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/states-await-supreme-court-hearing-on-
arizona-immigration-law.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) 
(describing the issues on which the Supreme Court hearing would focus) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33. See 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 113, § 1 (“The provisions of this act are intended 
to work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens 
and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.”). 
 34. See Minorities Expected to Be Majority in 2050, CNN (Aug. 13, 2008), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-08-13/us/census.minorities_1_hispanic-population-
census-bureau-white-population?_s=PM:US (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (noting the 
changing make-up of the American population) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 35. See Alex Nowrasteh, The Arizona Law Fights Phantom Problems, U.S. 
NEWS (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/is-arizonas-sb-1070-
immigration-law-constitutional/the-arizona-law-fights-phantom-problems (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2012) (noting that Arizona used the “so-called ‘illegal immigrant 
crime wave’” to justify its law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 36. See Lane DeGregory, Trayvon Martin’s Killing Shatters Safety Within 
Retreat at Twin Lakes in Sanford, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Mar. 25, 2012, 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/humaninterest/article1221799.ece (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2012) (describing the community in which George Zimmerman pursued 
and shot Martin) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 37. See Botelho, supra note 14 (describing what happened on the night Martin 
was killed). 
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police dispatcher told him when he called in, “OK. We don’t need 
you to do that.”38 
There apparently was a scuffle between the two, and, in a 
moment, the youth lay in the grass, bleeding to death from a 
gunshot wound.39  
Whatever we may assume about racial tension and its 
possible role in this tragic incident, we do know that it occurred 
in a community that wanted to be insulated from the threats that 
lay beyond its gate and its fences.40 That subdivision’s very name, 
the Retreat at Twin Lakes, tells of a desire to be left alone. 
But if we are to believe the findings in a new book by Rich 
Benjamin, such gated communities are creating a new cultural 
reality in America,41 and it is one in which the incident in 
Sanford may have been predictable. 
Benjamin is a black author whose book is titled Searching for 
Whitopia: An Improbable Journey to the Heart of White 
America.42 He spent two years traveling to see what life would be 
like in predominantly white, gated communities across the 
country.43 
The book, I suspect, will take its place in the annals of 
America’s cultural studies alongside such classics as Robert and 
Helen Lynd’s Middletown,44 their social science reflections on 
Muncie, Indiana; Thornton Wilder’s play Our Town,45 about the 
fictional village of Grover’s Corners, New Hampshire, and 
Sinclair Lewis’s satirical novel, Babbitt,46 about a businessman 
busily climbing the social ladder in the fictional town of Zenith, 
somewhere in the Midwest. 
                                                                                                     
 38. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39. See id. (stating that police “found Martin ‘face down in the grass’”). 
 40. See DeGregory, supra note 36 (describing the community as a place where 
“[e]verything was walled in, to keep out the unknown”). 
 41. See generally RICH BENJAMIN, SEARCHING FOR WHITOPIA: AN IMPROBABLE 
JOURNEY TO THE HEART OF WHITE AMERICA (2009) (discussing the growth of 
predominantly white communities, which Benjamin calls “whitopias,” throughout 
the United States). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. at 8 (stating that he “lived in three such communities”). 
 44. ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE (1929). 
 45. THORNTON WILDER, OUR TOWN (Harper & Row 1957) (1938). 
 46. SINCLAIR LEWIS, BABBITT (Library of America 1992) (1922). 
FROM PLYLER V. DOE TO TRAYVON MARTIN 1809 
Rich Benjamin’s judgment about a typical gated community 
is harsh.47 As he described his findings in The New York Times in 
March 2012, he said such a community is “self-contained, 
conservative and overzealous in its demands for ‘safety.’”48 “Gated 
communities,” he said, “churn a vicious cycle by attracting like-
minded residents who seek shelter from outsiders and whose 
physical seclusion then worsens paranoid groupthink against 
outsiders.”49 They have, he said, “a bunker mentality.”50 
If Benjamin is right, the presence of a hooded black teenager 
on a residential street at nighttime would be the personification 
of The Other,51 a disturber of domestic tranquility. And in the 
context of my remarks here, what happened to Trayvon Martin 
may be yet another example of the closing down of an open 
society. 
The phenomenon does not stop there.  
Reflect, for a moment, on the “bunker mentality”52 that has 
developed as America confronted global terrorism in the wake of 
the attacks of September 11, 2001. Former Vice President 
Cheney’s “one percent doctrine” exhibited that attitude: if there is 
a one percent chance that an act of terrorism will occur, it will 
occur, and preparation must be made to head it off at all cost.53 
We have 166 individuals still housed in the military prison at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and many of them have been cleared for 
release, but they have nowhere to go.54 The Congress of the 
                                                                                                     
 47. See generally BENJAMIN, supra note 41 (criticizing “whitopias,” which are 
becoming increasingly common in the United States). 
 48. Rich Benjamin, The Gated Community Mentality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/opinion/the-gated-community-
mentality.html ?r=2 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See generally PEPERZAK, supra note 8. 
 52. See Benjamin, supra note 48 (discussing the “bunker mentality”). 
 53. See RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA’S 
PURSUIT OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 62 (2006) (analyzing former Vice President 
Cheney’s view that “‘[i]f there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are 
helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as certainty 
in terms of our response’”). 
 54. See Huma Khan, Protests Mark Guantanamo Bay Detainee Center’s 10th 
Anniversary, ABC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2012, 2:11 PM), http://abcnews. 
go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01/protests-mark-guantanamo-bay-detainee-centers-
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United States has decreed that they cannot be brought to this 
country.55 In effect, the lawmakers have declared that the 
entirety of America is a gated community that these people dare 
not enter. Congress also has mandated that, if a Guantanamo 
prisoner should be sent to any other country, his or her life 
thereafter must be controlled by conditions that no self-respecting 
sovereign nation would agree to accept within its own borders.56 
Hence, many simply stay at Guantanamo. 
Four years ago, the Supreme Court declared that those at 
Guantanamo had a constitutional right to go to an American 
court to challenge their continued confinement, and a chance to 
obtain actual release.57 But the federal appeals court in 
Washington, D.C., in a string of decisions,58 has hollowed out that 
                                                                                                     
10th-anniversary/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (“Today, 171 detainees remain in the 
detention center, some of them deemed too dangerous to release and others with 
nowhere to go.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Since then, 
four prisoners have been released or transferred, and one detainee has died. See 
Rod Nickel, Guantanamo’s Last Western Detainee Returned to Canada, REUTERS 
(Sept. 29, 2012, 3:37 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/ 29/us-
guantanamo-khadr-idUSBRE88S0AN20120929 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (stating 
that 166 detainees now remain at Guantanamo) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 55. See Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, 
Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351 (prohibiting the use of 
appropriated funds for the transfer or release of Guantanamo detainees into the 
United States); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 
119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006) (“[N]o court, justice, 
or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of 
Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba . . . .”) amended by Military Commissions Act of 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36, invalidated by 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008). 
 56. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-81, § 1022, 125 Stat. 1298 (requiring al Qaeda detainees captured in the course 
of hostilities to be kept in military custody). 
 57. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (finding that 
Guantanamo detainees have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus). 
 58. See, e.g., Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (vacating 
the grant of a Guantanamo detainee’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and 
remanding the case for further consideration); Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 2 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (reversing the grant of a Guantanamo detainee’s petition for writ 
of habeas corpus), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012); Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 
400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (reversing the grant of a Guantanamo detainee’s petition 
for writ of habeas corpus and ordering the petition to be denied on remand), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 869 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (affirming the denial of a Guantanamo detainee’s petition for writ of habeas 
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legal remedy to the point where a judge on that court has said 
publicly that he does not believe any of his colleagues would 
uphold any federal judge’s order to release anyone from 
Guantanamo if there is even the slightest chance that they are, in 
fact, inclined toward terrorism59—when terrorism is defined so 
loosely that no one can know precisely what it means. 
And it is not even clear that habeas corpus, an increasingly 
limited legal option open to those held at Guantanamo Bay, is 
available for hundreds of other prisoners held by the United 
States military at a prison in Afghanistan.60 Those prisoners’ 
fates may be determined entirely by the Afghan government now 
that control of that prison has been handed over to local 
authorities.61 
Certainly, the government faces fierce and awesomely 
complicated challenges on what to do about terrorism, but surely 
we do not need to send the Constitution into wartime exile as 
part of that response. 
We seem also to have put the Constitution’s core concept of 
checks and balances on hold as we seek to know how the 
government is actually waging a “war on terrorism.” 
A doctrine of “state secrets” that began in 1950 as a limited 
means of excluding specific items of evidence bearing on national 
security from being explored in court cases62 has now 
mushroomed into a doctrine that shuts down judicial inquiry 
altogether, merely upon a classified declaration by a government 
                                                                                                     
corpus), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011). 
 59. See Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., 
concurring) (“I doubt any of my colleagues will vote to grant a petition if he or she 
believes that it is somewhat likely that the petitioner is an al Qaeda adherent or an 
active supporter.”). 
 60. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding “that 
the jurisdiction of the courts to afford the right to habeas relief and the protection 
of the Suspension Clause does not extend to aliens held in Executive detention in 
the Bagram detention facility in the Afghan theater of war”). 
 61. See Rod Nordland, Issues Linger as Afghans Take Control of a Prison, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/world/asia/ parwan-
prison-at-bagram-transferred-to-afghans-at-least-formally.html (last visited Nov. 
14, 2012) (describing the transfer of Bagram prison to Afghan authorities) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 62. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953) (discussing the 
judicially-created state secrets privilege). 
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security official.63 And those who have had a peek at the reasons 
claimed for such invocations of national security, while not 
revealing what they had learned, have said that the claims of 
national security are frequently exaggerated and often are based 
on no more than unfiltered raw intelligence of an extremely 
dubious kind.64 
There is a world of difference, of course, between an open 
society and a national security state, but one must ask whether 
there is no middle ground. Is there no way by which the Judiciary 
can inquire into the use of torture as a means of intelligence 
gathering? Is there no means by which the Judiciary can examine 
the policy of targeted killing even of United States citizens abroad 
who are deemed to be terrorist threats? And is there nowhere 
within the structure of government where the secret world of a 
thoroughly militarized Central Intelligence Agency can be 
meaningfully examined? 
Put another way, an abiding question for Americans living in 
this frightened age is whether accountability has become an 
unaffordable luxury, whether a faith in democratic principle is 
naively out of date. 
Are there other threats to the open society that we thought 
we had? Of course there are, and they have nothing to do with 
national security.  
America has never had an opportunity for openness to match 
what came with the arrival of the Digital Age. We know so much 
more about each other, including, perhaps, some things we would 
just as soon not know. But leaving that aside, has any one of you 
in this audience never marveled about what could be reached 
with a click or two of a mouse? What a universe of ideas and 
                                                                                                     
 63. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (“[W]e hold that the government’s valid assertion of the state 
secrets privilege warrants dismissal of the litigation . . . .”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
2442 (2011).   
 64. See Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Tatel, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he Report at issue here was produced in the fog of war by a 
clandestine method that we know almost nothing about. It is not familiar, 
transparent, generally understood as reliable, or accessible; nor is it mundane, 
quotidian data entry akin to state court dockets or tax receipts.”); see also Thomas 
I. Emerson, National Security and Civil Liberties, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 78, 
80 (1982) (stating that “[s]ubsequent events almost always demonstrate that the 
asserted dangers to national security have been grossly exaggerated”). 
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experiences is out there, and so very much of it is available free—
free of cost, free of predigestion, free of censorship, free of bias, 
free of lunacy. The selection of what to examine and to absorb or 
reject is solely by unmediated private choice. 
And I am not talking about the number of apps that you have 
on your phone that enable you to live your daily life so much more 
conveniently. I would imagine you have seen that television 
commercial in which one person has a great idea about 
something, only to be told by another person that it has already 
happened so many seconds ago. It almost seems that we have 
created apps that allow time to run backwards! 
But the digital world is not as open as you might think, and 
there are very real signs that it may lose more of its openness. 
From early on in this age, we have learned that electronic 
exploration and the concept of copyright were on a collision 
course or at least were in considerable tension. You may 
remember the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd.65 episode, in which the Supreme Court informed us that the 
free trade in creative expression was not really very free after 
all.66 We have heard a lot since then about piracy. 
That was nothing, though, in comparison to the restraints on 
digital communication that proposed new federal legislation 
would bring about. The so-called Stop Online Piracy Act,67 and 
variations of it, appeared to be absolutely draconian to major 
players in the digital community.68 And just when it seemed 
that the major entertainment and recording companies had 
Congress in their control on this issue, the Internet rose up in 
angry protest in January and drove that legislation off of the 
                                                                                                     
 65. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 66. See id. at 919 (“We hold that one who distributes a device with the object 
of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other 
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of 
infringement by third parties.”). 
 67. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 68. See Julianne Pepitone, Tech Giants Say SOPA Piracy Bill Is ‘Draconian,’ 
CNN MONEY (Nov. 16, 2011, 6:10 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/16/ 
technology/sopa/index.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (stating that the Stop Online 
Piracy Act “sparked a giant backlash from big tech companies, including Google 
and Facebook,” who viewed it as “far too strict and rife with unintended 
consequences”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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calendars in both the House and Senate.69 So much for a passive 
citizenry. But, we are told, the antipiracy movement is far from 
dead; it is just lying in wait for another opportunity.70 
One very unsettling facet about that entire incident is that 
among the loudest cheerleaders for the legislation was none 
other than the nation’s most fervent defender of First 
Amendment freedoms, renowned New York attorney Floyd 
Abrams.71 
One can be reasonably certain, I would suggest, that if the 
Stop Online Piracy Act or some version of it does emerge from 
Congress, its validity will be upheld by the Supreme Court—as 
long as the Court’s current prevailing view of copyright holds. 
While the Constitution speaks of copyright as protected only 
for “limited times,”72 the Court in the Eldred v. Ashcroft73 
decision in 2003 upheld the concept that limited does not really 
mean very limited.74 That decision validated the Hollywood-
initiated Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act75 that 
                                                                                                     
 69. See Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves 
Antipiracy Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/ 
technology/senate-postpones-piracy-vote.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) 
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 70. See Melissa Bell, Laws Alone Won’t Put a Lid on Piracy, WASH. POST, Jan. 
27, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/online-piracy-hasnt-gone-
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(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 71. See Letter from Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, to 
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 72. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 73. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 74. See id. at 204 (allowing Congress to extend the duration of existing 
copyrights). 
 75. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
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extended existing copyright protection on many creative works 
for very long additional periods.76 
And Eldred, it seems, did not reach the outermost expansion 
of copyright. Just this past January, in the decision in Golan v. 
Holder,77 the Supreme Court essentially destroyed—at least in 
constitutional terms—the concept of a “public domain.”78 
For at least the past thirty years, scholars have been 
developing the notion that, when a once-copyrighted work 
reaches the end of that monopoly protection, it enters into a 
“public domain” that has its own claim to constitutional 
protection, under the First Amendment.79 Works that had never 
been put under copyright in the United States were already in 
the “public domain” and, so it was argued, could not be 
withdrawn into a copyrighted status.80 
The Golan decision explicitly rejected that idea as a 
constitutionally grounded principle.81 Those who have been using 
for their own purposes a literary or musical work that has been in 
the public domain do not thereby acquire First Amendment 
protection against having such a work newly copyrighted, the 
Court said.82 
No one, the Court declared, obtains any personal right under 
the Constitution to copy or perform a work just because it has 
                                                                                                     
 76. See id. (extending copyright terms in the United States by twenty years). 
 77. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
 78. See id. at 878 (“Neither the Copyright and Patent Clause nor the First 
Amendment, we hold, makes the public domain, in any and all cases, a territory 
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 79. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First 
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 
360–64 (1999) (explaining the public domain); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 
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 80. See, e.g., Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 
U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 259 (2002) (“[T]he defining characteristic of the public 
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omitted). 
 81. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889–91 (explaining why a statute granting 
copyright protection to works already in the public domain did not violate the First 
Amendment). 
 82. See id. (finding that “nothing in the historical record, congressional 
practice, or [the Court’s] own jurisprudence warrants exceptional First Amendment 
solicitude for copyrighted works that were once in the public domain”). 
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come out from under earlier copyright protection or has never 
been copyrighted in the United States, so no one can object if 
copyright is later conferred.83 Any legal rights that exist belong 
only to the author or composer, it added.84 
And to add to the indignity of this insult to the public 
domain, the Court’s opinion disposed of the claim of 
constitutional significance for a public domain in a footnote—
Footnote 26.85 
The greatest casualty of the Golan and Eldred decisions, of 
course, is the global digital library that has been developing in 
recent years, and has been profoundly dependent upon the 
existence of a viable public domain. 
The risk to an open society of creative expression is now 
beyond dispute, even granting that some measure of copyright 
protection does contribute to the creative urge in artists, writers, 
and composers. How long, we may ask, must it exist before it 
stifles further creative expression that is derived from an 
original work? 
I would like to turn then to a final—and probably more 
controversial—threat to an open society. I refer, of course, to the 
effort, pursued in so many sectors of our public policy and our civic 
discourse, to exclude gays and lesbians from an equal role in society 
and its institutions—especially in those central institutions in 
mainstream culture, marriage86 and the military.87 
                                                                                                     
 83. See id. at 892 (“Anyone has free access to the public domain, but no one, 
after the copyright term has expired, acquires ownership rights in the once-
protected works.”). 
 84. See id. (“Rights typically vest at the outset of copyright protection, in an 
author or rightholder.” (citation omitted)). 
 85. Id. at 888 n.26 (disagreeing with the dissent’s suggestion “that at least 
where copyright legislation extends protection to works previously in the public 
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 86. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 
2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7) (“[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal 
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 87. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Don’t Ask 
Don’t Tell), Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1547, 1670–73 (1993) (codified at 
10 U.S.C. § 674) (codifying in federal statute the existing practice of prohibiting 
gays and lesbians from serving in the military), repealed by Don’t Ask Don’t Tell 
Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. 
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And this, of course, gives me an opportunity to return to 
Lewis Powell and his approach to life and the law. 
The gay rights issue, overall, is among the most agonizing 
public questions confronting America, and Lewis Powell’s own 
struggle with it was itself agonizing, as is so painfully examined 
in John Jeffries’s great biography of the Justice.88 Jeffries’s 
ultimate conclusion is that, “[o]n this issue, Powell never found 
the middle ground.”89 
Jeffries’s chapter on Bowers v. Hardwick,90 the 1986 
decision refusing to recognize constitutional equality for sexual 
intimacy for homosexuals, spells out in detail Justice Powell’s 
role in that case, switching sides but ultimately voting with the 
majority.91 In a real sense, Powell even then recognized the 
long-range constitutional implications of the controversy—the 
effect that could be expected on marriage and the military.92 
And he fretted deeply about that.93 
Although he would say, four years later, that he had made a 
mistake in Bowers, and that the dissenters there “had the better 
of the arguments,”94 it is far from clear that his mind and heart 
were ever settled on the ultimate question of gay equality. He 
died five years before Bowers was explicitly overruled in 
Lawrence v. Texas,95 which, of course, set the constitutional stage 
for challenges to the exclusion of gays both from the military and 
from the civil institution of marriage. 
America is probably more open politically to homosexual 
equality than it was in Lewis Powell’s day, and that ultimately 
                                                                                                     
 88. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 511–30 (1994) 
(describing Justice Powell’s struggle with the gay rights issue). 
 89. Id. at 530. 
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(finding a Georgia law criminalizing consensual homosexual sodomy 
constitutional), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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 93. See id. (acknowledging Powell’s concerns over the implications of Bowers). 
 94. Id. at 530. 
 95. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers v. Hardwick 
should be and now is overruled.”); Greenhouse, supra note 1 (announcing Justice 
Powell’s death in 1998). 
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may make a constitutional difference. The resolution of the issue, 
though, could certainly use—as part of the discussion—the sense 
of decency and humility that was so much a part of Justice 
Powell’s life. 
When one delivers a memorial lecture like this one, in honor 
of a person no longer with us, there may be a strong temptation 
to enlist that celebrated person as an ally on one side or the other 
of contemporary controversy. One might ask a variation of that 
popular question of today: What would Lewis Powell say? And 
one might pretend to know the answer. 
I have no idea how he would have reacted to each or any of 
the specific examples I have put forth here, or on the general 
question of what I see as the accelerating trend toward closing an 
open society. I have to believe he would have counseled caution 
and prudence, the exercise of measured judgment, and the 
patience to hear what the other side might have to say. 
Lewis Powell was a conservative, as a man and as a Justice, 
but I do not mean by that to place him in a static category along a 
fixed ideological spectrum. His conservatism seemed to me 
always to bespeak his belief that even society’s most intractable 
problems could be resolved if calm judgment were brought to bear 
in a spirit of mutual respect and accommodation. 
Many of the views that I have stated here today are, I 
recognize, at least tinged with values that most would recognize—
in today’s political parlance—as liberal in nature. I would feel that I 
had failed if they were received here only in that way. 
The openness of American society is not a liberal or a 
conservative cause; it is the essence of a society unafraid of change 
or of diversity, the character of a society that appreciates that time 
does not stand still and that civic reform is never fully done. 
And it is a society that looks forward to each new journey 
along an open road, remembering the advice that John Milton 
gave to Parliament nearly four centuries ago: “[H]e who thinks 
we are to pitch our tent here, and have attain[e]d the utmost 
prospect of reformation, . . . that man by this very opinion 
declares that he is yet far[] short of [t]ruth.”96 
Thank you. 
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